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The Issue 
In the early eighties, the EU was once labelled “the not-so-perfect customs union” (Donges, 
1981, p.11). The reason was that until the completion of the single market in 1992, EU 
member states still enjoyed national sovereignties in trade policies against non-member states, 
i.e., the right to temporarily waive the commitments of the common external trade policy 
under Art 115 EEC Treaty and to operate national quotas. These rights were gradually 
abandoned after 1992 when remaining national quotas for imports of bananas, Japanese cars 
and textiles and clothing were converted into community-wide regulations. However, the 
transition to a “perfect customs union” was limited to the industrial sector, in principle also to 
agriculture, because the EU Treaty in Art. 9 defines the customs union as a tariff union with 
common tariffs and tariff-equivalent charges against non-member states. As tariffs are mostly 
irrelevant for trade in services, there is no legal analogy in the Treaty between non-services 
and services concerning the customs union. An analogy, however, exists between the pre-
1992 not-so-perfect customs union and the post-1992 internal market for some services, in 
particular professional services. Pelkmans (1997, p. 108) labels this market “uncommon” due 
to a large number of EU member state-specific regulations concerning recognition of profes-  2 
sional qualifications, the rights of establishment and of cross-border supply. This suggests that 
the EU is still on the way of completing the stage of a free trade area in services. For the time 
_____________ 
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 being, it is neither a full free trade area nor a customs union. In Art. 133 of the consolidated 
version of the Treaty on the European Union and on the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community amended by the Nice Treaty (EU Official Journal 2002, C 325/01), it is specified 
that the same principle of the customs union in goods applies to services (Art. 133.5). Yet, 
there is shared competence of the Community and the member states in some services such as 
cultural and audiovisual services, in education services, as well as in social and human health. 
Therefore, national policies toward trade in services differ not only vis-à-vis non-member 
states but also between member states.  
While the EU Treaty draws a distinction between the customs union in goods and in 
services because of these specific services still under national competence, there is also a 
difference between the treatment of regional integration schemes in goods trade ( Art. XXIV 
GATT) and in service trade (Art. V GATS). Coverage in goods trade should comprise 
virtually all trade whereas in service trade only „substantial sectoral coverage“ is needed. The 
latter requirement is far less binding and enables countries to enter into regional agreements 
which provide different degrees of policy discrimination between members and non-members. 
Policy discrimination in goods trade is stronger than in service trade. Even more striking are 
differences between GATT and GATS in opening markets (market access) and in the 
provision that foreign products (goods or services) should not be treated less favorable than 
domestically produced “like” products (national treatment). Commitments to concessions in 
market access in GATS can be subject to six limitations (Art XVI GATS) which do not have   3 
an analogy in goods trade. Likewise, national treatment is not a general principle in GATS 
(Art. XVII) to specific horizontal (valid for all service sectors) and sector-specific 
concessions. 
To what extent and in which sectors the customs union objective has been missed up to 
now escapes comprehensive quantification. This is because services can be supplied through 
different modes (via trade or factor movement) which are mostly not subject to border charges 
but to domestic legally defined non-price barriers, for instance, through denial of rights of 
establishment (capital movement) or obstacles against migrant inflows (labour movement). 
Therefore, next to market access, conditions for national treatment are at least as important as 
determinants for service trade. Even if foreign suppliers have access to foreign markets they 
can easily be discriminated against competing domestic suppliers. The heterogeneity of both 
service sub-sectors and policy measures makes quantification of barriers equivalent to goods 
trade virtually impossible. Furthermore, even if the extent of deviations of national policies 
from a common policy against non-member countries could be quantified, this does not yet 
allow a conclusion on its political relevance. The reason is that horizontal commitments 
relevant for all service sectors may be identical over EU member states and that these 
commitments cover the relevant part of the service supply. Sector-specific vertical 
commitments may differ among member states but are in service „niches“ where the public 
interest is not sensitive. For instance, all EU member states limit market access for services 
provided by commercial presence in the consumer country which are considered as public 
utilities being subject to public monopolies or to exclusive rights granted to private operators. 
Such a monopoly exists in primary school education. Private operators (for instance, schools 
operated by the churches) must comply with specific obligations fixed by the public 
monopolies. „Niche“ services can be special private education services subject to country-
specific special commitments. There are also horizontal commitments which are specific to   4 
individual EU member states, such as limits for non-residents to purchase real estate in 
Denmark. Therefore, sector-specific commitments have to be seen in conjunction with 
horizontal commitments and the weight of these specific sectors in all sectors. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the degree to which the EU still deviates 
from a customs union in services. The empirical tools for this endeavour are frequency indices 
based on the list of sector-specific concessions which the EU in February 2003 has offered in 
the context of the multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO, the so-called Doha Round 
(GATS 2003). The principle underlying these negotiations in services is the existence of a 
positive list of sectors which each WTO member state is prepared to open to foreign trade and 
a negative list of measures which the member state is determined to maintain in these sectors. 
Concessions vary by the four modes of supply which the General Agreement for Trade in 
Services (GATS) has introduced (cross-border trade (1), consumption abroad (2), commercial 
presence (3) and temporary presence of natural persons(4)) and by market access and national 
treatment. Therefore, the GATS structure differs substantially from the GATT structure, not 
only with respect to the distinction between pricing and non-pricing measures but also with 
respect to the absence of liberalisation formulas or protection dismantling “across the board”. 
To convert qualitative information into a numerical assessment of the degree of trade 
restrictions, there has been a number of approaches ranging from frequency indices to price 
equivalents which have been applied in the literature. Given that the quality of indicators 
seems to rise with the homogeneity of service sectors and given that this paper addresses the 
entire range of service sectors negotiated in the WTO, it is proposed to apply the traditional 
Hoekman approach (1996) which encompasses all sectors. Yet, it is proposed to modify this 
approach in order to take account of differences in in-between commitments concerning the 
various modes of supply. Section II applies a modified frequency indices approach to the EU 
purpose for sector-specific concessions in the Doha Round. Section III introduces three basic   5 
national policy measures which are responsible for the deviation of the EU from a customs 
union. Section IV concludes on the preliminary results and addresses the need for further 
research concerning impact analyses of barriers to trade in services. 
I. The Measurement of Trade Restrictions in Services: The Role of Frequency Indices 
Frequency indices for assessing the importance of non-tariff barriers to trade have a long 
tradition in trade barrier inventories. In the realm of goods, they were first introduced during 
the Tokyo Round and became a standard workhorse for the GATT Secretariat and other 
institutions (Nogués, Olechowski, Winters, 1986). Hoekman (1996) and later Poveda and 
Droege (1997)) using the Hoekman approach applied the frequency indices approach to 
services by developing a three-level weighting approach. To each of the 155 service 
categories categorised in the GATS differentiated by the four modes of supply and the two 
areas of commitments (market access and national treatment) Hoekman allocates a number 
which proxies the degree of restrictiveness. The GATS differentiates between commitments 
where a member, on the one hand, agrees to bind a measure without any qualification (entry 
“none”) as the least restrictive option and, on the other hand, exempts the service from any 
binding commitment (entry “unbound”) or does not make a commitment at all as the most 
restrictive option. Consequently, Hoekman  gives weights of 1 for the former and 0 for the 
latter option. In between are commitments which are bound but where either specific 
restrictions are maintained or where specific reference is made to restrictions holding for all 
services listed as horizontal commitments. These commitments range between 1 and 0 and, as 
they cannot be further quantified, are given the weight of 0.5. It is this in-between category 
which can be particularly questioned as there is no distinction between a negligible restriction 
which has a minor impact on trade and a restriction which comes close to a trade restrictive 
“unbound” entry (Warren, Findlay  2000, p.  63). Furthermore, as the index interpretes the 
entry „unbound“ as highest restriction it cannot account for the possibility that a country is   6 
not prepared to make any commitment though there a no restrictions on trade in that service 
sector or because this sector does not exist in the economy. While many researchers have 
nevertheless continuously applied the Hoekman index (see McGuire, 2003: 40 and the 
literature cited there), in-depth studies on individual sectors have tried to cluster restrictions of 
a similar impact. Based on such similarities of different measures, either indices of trade 
restrictiveness or trade openness have been calculated. Such endeavours prove to be the more 
fruitful the more homogenous the service sectors are. The banking sector has been the 
prefered sector to improve the index calculation for two reasons. First, one mode of supply, 
commercial presence, can directly be linked to the two criteria of GATS, market access and 
national treatment, in the sense that governments can either restrict market access by limiting 
the issue of banking licences in total irrespective whether or not banks are owned by non-
residents or residents. Alternatively, the number of foreign banks allowed to set up 
subsidiaries can be restricted thus affecting national treatment. Second, the three other modes 
of supply (cross-border supply, consumption abroad and movement of natural persons) affect 
the operational part of banking business, for instance, whether foreign banks are allowed to 
provide services in local currency or from which services they are excluded compared to local 
banks. Again, it is easily possible to distinguish between restrictions in the operational part 
imposed on all banks (market access) and restrictions imposed on foreign banks only 
(national treatment) and thus to disaggregate trade policy measures by these clusters 
(McGuire, Schuele 2000). 
Further improvements in measuring trade restrictions in services would be to see indices as 
proxies for taxes imposed either on factor flows through measures against commercial 
presence and movements of natural persons or on service flows through measures against 
cross-border trade or consumption abroad. To quantify such taxes, it is required to convert 
indices into tariff equivalents by means of conversion factors to be developed from sector-  7 
specific information. Finally, trade restriction indices enter the most sophisticated approach of 
using them as input into econometric models estimating price and cost effects of restrictions 
based on assessing determinants of performance in the sectors. This approach has been used 
again for few relatively homogenous sectors including banking, telecommunications and 
engineering (cf see Bosworth 2000 and Warren 2000).  
Given the heterogeneity of the 155 different WTO standardised service sectors, we first 
rely on the initial Hoekman frequency indicator with the three-category weighting method. 
Table 1 shows weighted shares of concessions offered by the EU (including special requests 
 
Table 1 — Specific Concessions of EU and EU Member States in Services Offered in the Doha Round, by 
Modes of Supply, February 2003
a 
 
Limitations on Market Access 
(MA) 
Limitations on National 
Treatment (NT) 
MA + NT 
 1  2  3  4 1 2 3 4 1 2  3 4
Belgium 57.1  89.4  84.5  0.4 56.6 90.3 86.7 2.2 56.9 89.8  85.6 1.3
Denmark 60.2  89.4  85.8  2.7 59.3 90.3 84.5 4.4 59.7 89.8  85.2 3.5
Germany 56.6  87.6  81.9  1.8 55.3 88.5 85.0 2.2 56.0 88.1  83.4 2.0
Greece 55.8  89.4  83.6  4.9 54.9 90.3 85.8 0.9 55.3 89.8 84.7 2.9
Spain 57.5  89.8  78.3  1.3 57.5 90.3 86.7 1.3 57.5 90.0  82.5 1.3
France 51.8  88.5  79.2  9.7 54.0 90.3 84.5 2.7 52.9 89.4  81.9 6.2
Ireland 56.6  89.8  85.8  0.0 55.8 90.3 86.7 0.9 56.2 90.0  86.3 0.4
Italy 50.4  88.9  77.0  5.3 49.1 90.3 85.4 9.3 49.8 89.6  81.2 7.3
Luxembourg 61.5  89.8  86.7 0.4 60.2 90.3 86.7 0.9 60.8 90.0  86.7 0.7
Netherlands 59.7  89.8  86.7  0.0 58.4 90.3 86.7 0.9 59.1 90.0 86.7 0.4
Austria 65.5  87.2  82.3  6.2 62.4 88.1 85.0 1.8 63.9 87.6  83.6 4.0
Portugal 54.0  89.8  74.8  2.7 53.1 90.3 84.1 6.6 53.5 90.0  79.4 4.6
Finland 58.8  77.0  74.3  0.9 58.8 78.3 75.2 57.1 58.8 77.7  74.8 29.0
Sweden 57.5  80.5  74.3  1.3 56.6 81.4 74.8 3.1 57.1 81.0  74.6 2.2
United 
Kingdom 60.6  89.8  86.7  3.5 59.3 90.3 86.7 0.9 60.0 90.0  86.7 2.2
Unweighted 
Average 57.6  87.8  81.5  2.7 56.8 88.6 84.3 6.3 57.2 88.2  82.9 4.5
Coefficient of 
variation  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.2  0.3 0.5
EU
b 56.2  88.4  81.4  3.9 55.6 89.4 85.1 3.8 55.9 88.9  83.3 3.8
a Sectors - modes as a share of maximum possible. weighted by openness or binding factors (0; 0.5; 1). 
b Average weighted with member state share in EU Gross National Income in 2000. 
Modes of supply:  
1 Cross-border supply;  2 Consumption abroad; 3 Commercial presence; 4 Presence of natural persons 
Source: GATS (2003). Own calculations. 
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of EU member states) as a share of maximum possible for all modes. Concessions cover 113 
of 155 sectors possible for which the EU list of offers contains entries. The last line shows the 
EU average in which EU member states’ regulations are weighted with the share of the states 
in the EU gross national income. Concessions in both market access and national treatment 
are added to a maximum of 1240 commitments (155 x 4 x 2; see Hoekman op. cit:101). In 
general, there are more  differences between modes of supply in each country than between 
countries in each mode of supply. By far the lowest concessions in terms of would have been 
the maximum are offered in mode 4 both in market access as well in national treatment (the 
latter with the notable exception of Finland). This is not surprising as the EU together with 
other WTO member states sees mode 4 as a possible entry gate for  the inflow of low-skilled 
migrants and thus as a potential circumvention of restrictive migration regulations in the 
member states. It is more surprising that concessions are smaller in cross-border flows than in 
the two other modes where concessions approach the 90 per cent level of the maximum. This 
is probably due to the fact that the EU is not prepared to bind concessions in cross-border 
exchange of services where consumer protection is seen as a sensitive issue and where such 
protection is not assumed to be secured by mode 1 supply. Without disaggregating between 
service sectors, the average level of commitments does not differ much between EU member 
states thus explaining relatively low coefficients of variation
1. Overall, the coefficient is 
                                            
1   The structure of offers of EU member states disaggregated by eleven out of twelve sectors (at the one-digit 
level) is available from the author upon request. Construction services were disregarded because the EU 
restricted its offer to one activity only. In general, the conclusion holds that both in restrictive and less 
restrictive offers there is a solid ground of uniformity in EU member states’ offers, including restrictiveness 
toward mode 4 concessions. Mode 2  concessions show the highest amount of similarity of concessions and 
thus the closed proximity to a customs union. Country-specific regulations are the highest in Sweden and 
Finland if concessions in market access and national treatment are summed up. Special “outliers” deserve 
attention, for instance, the high degree of restrictiveness of French offers in distribution services or Austrian 
few offers in transport services supplied through mode 2.        9 
higher in mode 4. This is where one can therefore expect the largest deviation from the 
customs union principle (like in migration policies). 
II. A Modified Frequency Indices Approach to EU Sector-Specific Concessions in 
Services 
The following approach aims at identifying such differences between sector-specific 
concessions of individual EU member states in order to substantiate (or reject) the hypothesis 
of a complete or incomplete customs union. Given this purpose and the heterogeneity of the 
155 different WTO standardised service sectors, we retreat to the initial Hoekman approach 
introduced above but modify and expand it with respect to the in-between category 0.5 
(ranging between „unbound“ and „none“).
2 We depart from the empirical experience that 
among the four modes of supply, cross-border trade and especially consumption abroad, are 
the least restricted relative to other two modes (cf Brown, Stern 2001; Maurer, Chauvet 2002). 
This holds because technological innovations in the IT-industry make policy-induced 
segmentation of national markets from the world market difficult if not impossible and 
because many services for technical reasons cannot be supplied through the consumption 
abroad mode. It is for this reason why consumption abroad is estimated to account for only 
about 20 per cent of world trade in services, particularly in travel and tourism (ibid: 242). As a 
rule of thumb, services supplied by cross-border factor flows (mode 3 for capital and mode 4 
for labor) are more restrictively treated than services supplied by direct exchange between 
suppliers and consumers (modes 1 and 2). As concerns labor flows, Table 1 clearly highlights 
the restrictive stance of the EU towards concessions in mode 4. 
                                            
2   I owe this proposal to one of the referees who argued in favor on three instead of only one intermediate 
value.    10 
Therefore, in the modified Hoekman approach we allocate the highest degree of openness 
(value 1) if in all four modes there are no restrictions (entry „none“). The degree which is the 
closest to this corner point is when either and/or in modes 3 and 4 no restrictions are imposed 
irrespective of whether there are commitments given in modes 1 and/or 2. In these cases, we 
allocate a value of 0.75. Departing from the other corner point (all modes of supply show 
„unbound“ commitments thus leading to a zero value), we allocate a value of 0.25 if 
commitments in modes 1 and 2 are unbound while either in mode 3 and/or in mode 4 there are 
sector-specific commitments. We regard this combination as a relatively low degree of 
openness close to the complete denial of any binding of commitments because of the 
importance of service trade enabled by factor flows. All remaining in-between sector-specific 
commitments are given 0.5. This modification of the Hoekman index is motivated by the need 
to identify differences in the sectors-modes structure of concessions between member states. 
The larger the differences the more one can assume deviations from a customs union to exist. 
So far the coefficients of variation based on the unweighted averages of EU member states in 
Table 1 suggest differences between member states to be relatively small in all modes but 
larger in mode 4. It is not clear, however, whether this result still holds if factor-flow modes 
are given a higher weight in the assessment of openness to service trade as the modified 
Hoekman index is aiming at. For that purpose we add the five category weights for each 
service sector separately for market access and national treatment over all modes for each 
member state and for each pair of member states calculate the so-called overlap or similarity 
index which has been frequently in trade structure analyses (Finger, Kreinin 1979). In our 
case, it is asked which proportion of a EU member state a’s concession is ‘matched’ by 
concessions of member state b in the same service sector. The index ranges between 0 (no 
overlap) and 100 ( total overlap). A total overlap would point to identical concessions towards 
non-member countries and thus would indicate a complete customs union.     11 
Based on all 113 sectors in which the EU offered concessions Table 2 lists all 
combinations of similarities between pair of EU member states. The breakdown confirms 
earlier findings from Table 1. Generally, similarity is high, between 90 and 100 per cent. 
Hence, the EU appears close to a customs union with some elements of national “specialities” 
of trade policy sovereignty, especially in three member states (Austria, Finland and Sweden). 
   12 
Table 2 - Similarity Index (SI) for Sector-Specific Concessions
a of the EU and EU Member States in Services 
a)  on  Market  Access  (MA)          




lands Austria  Portugal Finland  Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Belgium     98.1 98.3 97.2 94.1 95.0 98.1 93.3 98.5 98.5 93.7 93.1 92.9 91.5 97.7
Denmark        98.5 96.7 93.6 93.9 98.9 92.6 98.9 98.9 93.0 92.4 91.7 90.6 98.9
Germany           97.0 93.7 94.5 99.1 93.1 98.5 98.5 93.6 92.6 92.5 90.8 98.9
Greece             93.8 93.0 96.6 92.8 97.1 97.1 93.4 92.1 92.4 90.9 96.7
Spain                 94.9 93.8 97.3 93.5 93.5 91.5 96.6 93.3 92.2 93.5
France                    94.3 94.7 94.0 94.0 91.8 94.8 93.5 91.3 94.0
Ireland                      93.0 98.5 98.5 93.4 92.7 92.2 90.9 99.4
Italy                          92.5 92.5 90.8 97.7 93.2 92.3 92.5
Luxembourg                            100.0 93.5 92.2 92.4 91.0 99.1
Netherlands                               93.5 92.2 92.4 91.0 99.1
Austria                                   90.0 91.2 91.3 93.0
Portugal                                      94.2 92.2 92.2
Finland                                         95.8 91.9
Sweden                                            90.5
United Kingdom                                           
b) on National Treatment (NT) 
   Belgium Denmark Germany Greece  Spain France  Ireland Italy Luxem-
bourg 
Nether-
lands  Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United 
Kingdom 
Belgium     99.0 99.2 99.2 99.6 98.8 99.6 97.2 99.6 99.6 94.7 99.2 91.3 89.5 99.6
Denmark        99.2 99.0 99.2 98.4 99.4 96.5 99.4 99.4 94.6 98.8 90.9 89.4 99.4
Germany           99.4 99.6 98.8 99.6 96.7 99.6 99.6 95.2 99.2 91.2 89.5 99.6
Greece             99.6 99.0 99.6 96.9 99.6 99.6 95.0 98.8 91.3 90.0 99.6
Spain                 99.2 99.8 97.1 99.8 99.8 95.0 99.2 91.1 89.7 99.8
France                    99.0 97.3 99.0 99.0 95.2 98.4 90.6 89.8 99.0
Ireland                       97.0 100.0 100.0 95.0 99.2 91.2 89.7 100.0
Italy                          97.0 97.0 92.9 97.0 90.0 90.1 97.0
Luxembourg                            100.0 95.0 99.2 91.2 89.7 100.0
Netherlands                               95.0 99.2 91.2 89.7 100.0
Austria                                   94.5 88.7 89.6 95.0
Portugal                                      91.2 89.2 99.2
Finland                                         89.3 91.2
Sweden                                            89.7
United Kingdom                                           
aSI = Σi Minimum [TCa, TCb] 100, where TCa (TCb) is the share of trade concessions of EU member state a (EU member state b) for each sector i in total trade concessions over 
all service sectors. Concessions are defined as the sum of the five category weights over all modes in each sector. 
Source: See Table 1.   13 
III. Characteristics of EU Member States Specific Concessions in Service Trade 
Principally, EU member states use three major instruments to enforce national policy 
guidelines.  
  One instrument of national policy occasionally used by member states is the economic 
needs test. In the GATS, Art. XVI:2 permits resort to economic needs tests.  Through such a 
test, governments of Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and Portugal, in wholesale and retail 
service trade, for instance, set a limit to the number of department stores in order to prevent 
“ruinous” competition, to facilitate transport infrastructure planning and to regulate the spatial 
distribution of stores. Similar restrictions exist for hospital services where some of the 
member states submit liberalization of trade in hospital services to health plans regulating the 
number of beds. The shortcomings of such needs tests are well known (Low, Mattoo, 2000). 
They create uncertainty about the stability of market accessibility. Furthermore, they tend to 
be more trade-restrictive than is necessary to meet those domestic political and social targets 
which governments fear to be endangered in the absence of regulation. Unavoidably, such 
needs test are based on ex post data and underrate the speed of structural change, incentives 
and market-based responses. As concerns EU external trade, economic needs tests in 
wholesale and retail trade services can be instrumental to inhibit the traditional mode of 
delivery (commercial presence) and to give incentives to explore new modes (such as internet 
pharmacies) which again would meet restrictive measures by member states because of 
consumer protection purposes. New entrants, for instance, retail chains from the US, would 
either be deterred to supply services at all or invest in these new modes. Such response to 
barriers is not exclusive to the economic needs tests but given its unspecified nature it might 
trigger higher economic costs than a clearly specified price measure or a quantitative 
restriction. In short, the economic needs test can be instrumental to accelerate search for new 
modes of supply if a traditional mode would no longer be accessible for non-EU entrants. 
Since some EU member states do no insist on such tests, intra-EU trade in services is also   14 
impeded as the supply of services via less restrictive member states through other modes 
would also face constraints as it has been the case with internet pharmacies. 
  Another set of member state-specific measures which prevail in professional services are a 
nationality condition for all modes of supply, the ban against services supplied under specific 
company laws under mode 3 and the exclusive supply of person-related services by natural 
persons only under the same mode. This group of measures creates different conditions of 
establishment among EU member states  and prevents options for non-EU-originating 
suppliers to use one EU member state market as a stepping stone for access to another one 
without the need to change the legal status of the supplier. 
  Thirdly, EU member states differ in their concessions offered by residence criteria. Such 
criteria hold for natural persons as well as for companies. The latter, for instance, are 
restricted in supplying specific insurance services through mode 1 only if the head office is 
based in the EU or the European  Economic Area, respectively. Alternatively, member states 
like Germany or Sweden authorize branches established and licensed in the member state as 
sole supplier of that service rather than other branches of a company. The underlying motive 
seems to protect consumers by creating a home bias of supply close to the consumer. 
Residence criteria are also applied to natural persons if they act in a responsible position on 
behalf of the company (founder, CEO, board of directors, supervisory council). Such 
restrictions are frequently found in offers for trade in financial services other than insurance 
services. 
  To what extent EU member state-specific restrictions raise transaction costs of supplying 
the EU market for non-EU members relative to EU members is the essential indicator of 
discrimination and trade diversion. Given the lack of data, this indicator cannot be quantified. 
Unlike in trade in goods where interested third parties such as the US Trade Representative 
can easily commission studies to approximate nullification or impairment of WTO benefits 
due to EU policies, such impact studies mostly escape quantification in services especially in   15 
trade through factor movements (modes 3 and 4). In the EU case, quantification even proves 
more difficult because of the non-fulfillment of the customs union principle. 
IV. Implications for the  Doha Negotiation Process and Issues for Further Research 
EU member states’ specifics in trade in services make the coordination process within the EU  
time-consuming and cumbersome. This process runs parallel to the negotiations of the EU 
Commisssion in the Doha Round. The February 2003 offer is a first step which will be 
revised time and again. Interestingly, prior to that date, the pressure to improve the EU offer 
beyond what had already been discussed with WTO member states since year 2000, has led 
already to the dismantling of many EU member state-specific restrictions. As a result, by 
February 2003, the EU has already been closer to the status of a customs union in services 
than before. This process will continue as of EU Commission urges upon member states to 
comply with the commitments to remove any trade barrier within the EU. Opening the access 
for German consumers to internet pharmacies located in the Netherlands in early 2004, has 
been part of this process. It is therefore likely that some if not many of the still existing 
national restrictions will be dismantled in the course of the negotiations so that the process 
toward a customs union for services is likely to be driven both by the multilateral negotiations 
and the permanent process of integration deepening and completing the Single Market. This is 
not a new phenomenon. A similar process occurred when between 1958 and 1968, the EEC 
became a free trade area in industrial goods and when this process coincided with the GATT 
negotiations (the Dillon Round and the Kennedy Round) promoting the formation of the EEC 
as a customs union in these goods.  
  A major barrier against a rapid conclusion of the customs union, however, is the average 
standard of restrictions to be maintained. Unlike in goods, tariff levels are not available to fix 
this average for services. Moreover, many of the national measures are deeply rooted in the  
history, culture and other pecularities of the member states, for instance, in different degrees   16 
of fiscal federalism with different competences for services supplied either under federal or 
sub-federal responsibility. The fear that labor-intensive services could face adjustment 
pressure from foreign suppliers once more restrictions are dropped seems to be as unevenly 
distributed among member states as the inflows of migrants. Another disintegrating element is 
the discrepancy between EU member state governments concerning the perception of 
Anglosaxon dominance in some services, e.g. in audiovisual services. Where this dominance 
is not seen as a challenge to cultural identity, a customs union will be seen less as a threat than 
elsewhere. A helpful principle for agreeing to a customs union would be to extend the famous 
principle of the Cassis de Dijon Case (mutual recognition of national standards once the good 
or service has been orderly supplied on the home market for long time) to selected third 
countries, preferably other OECD countries. Further research must concentrate on going 
beyond frequency indices to quantify the impact of restrictions in trade in services in general 
and on finding an appropriate quantitative benchmark for an EU customs union which is truly 
complete.  
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